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NOTES
BANKRUPTCY EXAMINERS UNDER SECTION 1104(b):
APPOINTMENT AND ROLE IN COMPLEX CHAPTER 11
REORGANIZATIONS OF FAILED LBOs
The appointment of examiners in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases merits
increased attention as the explosion of leveraged buyouts ("LBOs")1 in
the 1980s2 threatens to force unsuccessful LBO companies into bank-
ruptcy reorganization in the 1990s.3 As LBOs grew in popularity over
the last decade,4 scholars lauded the concept of the leveraged buyout as
an effective financial mechanism.5 Today, however, many targeted com-
panies saddled with asset-poor balance sheets cannot meet their sizeable
debt obligations,6 and must seek bankruptcy protection from creditors
and equity holders.7
1. "An LBO, or leveraged buyout, is a business transaction in which a company is sold under
a financial arrangement whereby the purchasers borrow all, or substantially all, of the purchase price
which is secured by mortgages on the asserts of the selling company." In re Ohio Corrugating Co.,
91 B.R. 430, 432 n.l (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
2. One hundred twenty of the 'Forbes 1990 List of the 400 Largest Private Firms in the
United States' became private in the 1980s. Sabin Russell, Forbes 400 Private Firms Grow, but at
Slower Pace, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 26, 1990, at C2. One hundred and one of these firms became
private since 1985. Id. As of 1990, revenues from the 400 largest private businesses totaled $609
billion. Id.
3. Richard E. Mendales, The New Junkyard of Corporate Finance: The Treatment of Junk
Bonds in Bankruptcy, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 1137, 1139 (1991). See also Mary Goulet, The Rights of
Debtholders When a Leveraged Corporation Fails, 15 J. CORP. L. 257 (1990) (explaining that due to
the inability to service the debt, highly leveraged companies are ripe candidates for business failure
in the next recession).
4. Fifty-six percent of the high-yield LBO market, which amounted to $211 billion in 1990,
was created in 1988 and 1989. Financial Advisor Says Bankruptcy Laws Fail to Protect LBO-Related
Bondholders, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 166 (Feb. 2, 1990). Over 50% of LBO
transactions occurred after 1987. Id.
5. Several scholars have suggested that LBOs are economically efficient and benefit creditors.
See Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain,
38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985). But see David A. Kaplan, M&As: Should Congress Act? Public Says
the Process is Corrupt, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 27, 1989, at I (describing the results of a National Law
Journal/Lexis poll in which 84% of Americans surveyed considered the mergers and acquisitions
environment corrupt and disturbing).
6. See Margaret Sheneman et al., Property of the Estate and Avoiding Powers, in UNDER-
STANDING BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY - How To HANDLE EVERYDAY PROBLEMS, A SATELLITE PRO-
GRAM 7, 26-27 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 576, 1990).
7. See id. at 26. In a typical leveraged buyout, the purchaser ("Buyout Group") acquires the
stock of a targeted company ("Target"). Id. Unlike a conventional acquisition, the buyer does not
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When a corporation files Chapter 11 reorganization bankruptcy, the
Bankruptcy Code8 specifically authorizes the bankruptcy court to ap-
point a trustee to operate the business and displace the debtor's manage-
ment, which acts as "debtor-in-possession" from the commencement of
the bankruptcy.' However, most parties in interest will not request a
trustee because the debtor-in-possession is usually better situated to con-
tinue operating the business throughout the reorganization process.10
purchase the company's assets. Id. Instead, the Buyout Group forms a sparsely capitalized corpo-
ration ("Acquisition") for the sole purpose of acquiring Target's stock. Sally S. Neely, Leveraged
Buyouts: Fraudulent Conveyances of What?, in THE FAILED LBO: How TO RESTRUCTURE THE
TROUBLED BUSINESS UNDER CHAPTER 11 561, 565 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials, 1990).
Risking little, if any, equity capital, the Buyout Group finances the purchase primarily by issuing
debt. Id. The public or financial institutions customarily purchase the debt through junk bonds.
Id. Alternatively, the Buyout Group may sell or exchange the debt to the selling shareholders.
Sheneman et al., supra note 6, at 26. The Buyout Group usually secures the debt with a lien on the
assets of the targeted corporation. Id. Next, the Buyout Group uses the proceeds from the sale of
various debt instruments and any loan proceeds to compensate the selling stockholders. Id. at 27.
The targeted company receives little, if any, of the loan proceeds. Id. Instead, because the Buyout
Group financed the acquisition with financing secured by the targeted company's assets, the Buyout
Group creates a debt-loaded targeted company with a highly leveraged balance sheet. Neely, supra,
at 565.
Shortly after financiers created the LBO concept, some scholars praised those who utilized LBO
transactions. Sheneman et al., supra note 6, at 27. See supra note 5. These commentators believed
that debt benefitted a company and maximized its profitability. In reality, many leveraged buyout
transactions proved unsuccessful. Joseph H. Levie, Financing the Debtor-in-Possession: Superpriori-
ties and Financing Orders, N.Y. L.J., July 11, 1991, at 5. After overloading the amount of debt in
the LBO, many of these newly private companies filed bankruptcy. Id. In addition, the creditors of
the unsuccessful targeted companies have often attacked the LBOs as fraudulent conveyances.
Sheneman et al., supra note 6, at 28-30.
The effect of a fraudulent conveyance attack is beyond the scope of this Note. For a general
discussion of fraudulent conveyances and LBOs, see Kathryn V. Smyser, Going Private and Going
Under: Leveraged Buyouts and the Fraudulent Conveyance Problem, 63 IND. L.J. 781 (1988); Kevin
J. Liss, Note, Fraudulent Conveyances and Leveraged Buyouts, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1491 (1987).
8. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)) [hereinafter Bankruptcy Code or Code].
9. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988). The Bankruptcy Code permits the bankruptcy court to appoint
a trustee any time after commencement of the case only if such appointment is in the creditors' best
interests or if "cause" exists. Id. The Code defines "cause" as "fraud, dishonesty, incompetence or
gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1988). If the court
appoints a trustee, he displaces the debtor's current management. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1108 (1988).
If the court chooses not to appoint a trustee, the debtor, as "debtor-in-possession," continues to run
the company. II U.S.C. § 1107 (1988). A "debtor-in-possession" means the "debtor except where
a person.., is serving as trustee in the case." 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (1988). The trustee possesses broad
powers, including operating the debtor's business, filing schedules and confirmation plans, investigat-
ing the debtor and issuing reports to the court. 11 U.S.C. § 1106 (1988 & Supp. 1991).
10. Peter F. Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 312 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 301, 322 (1988). Most creditors prefer the debtor to continue to operate the business. Id. The
creditors indicate this preference when they accept the debtor's decision to file Chapter 11, instead of
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The Code and the courts consider the trustee's appointment as both an
extraordinary remedy and a drain on essential assets of the bankruptcy
estate."1 Therefore, if the bankruptcy court decides not to appoint a
trustee, the Code allows for the appointment of an examiner. 12 The ap-
pointment of an examiner in failed LBO cases as a less restrictive, more
cost-effective alternative to a trustee is growing in importance. However,
the bankruptcy examiner's appointment and powers in the Chapter 11
reorganization process remain unclear 3 because of the sparse amount of
case law concerning examiners. 14
This Note contends that Congress should revise the Bankruptcy Code
provisions to clarify the role of examiners in the reorganization process.
Bankruptcy courts need more guidance regarding the examiner's powers
and duties as his role in complex Chapter 11 reorganizations of failed
Chapter 7 liquidation. Id. See, eg., In re Anchorage Boat Sales, Inc., 4 B.R. 635, 644 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1980) (appointing a trustee in a Chapter 11 case is an extraordinary remedy, which may
preclude an effective reorganization because the trustee imposes substantial burdens on the finan-
cially strapped debtor). See also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963 [hereinafter House Report]. The House Report notes that "very often the
creditors will be benefitted by continuation of the debtor in possession, both because the expense of a
trustee will not be required, and the debtor, who is familiar with his business, will be better able to
operate it during the reorganization case." Id. at 6192.
11. Michael S. Lurvey & Robert J. Rosenberg, The Battles for Confirmation of Chapter 11
Plans in DOING BUSINESS WITH TROUBLED COMPANIES 505, 522 (PLI Com. L. & Practice Course
Handbook No. 582, 1991). The trustee ousts the debtor's management and operates the business.
Id. However, often the creditors object to the trustee's appointment because his appointment results
in additional expenses to the estate. Id.
12. Lawrence K. Snider, The Examiner in the Reorganization Process: A Need to Modify, 45
Bus. LAW. 35 (Nov. 1989). The drafters of the Code based the examiner provision on the examiner
section in Chapter X of the former Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 35 (citing Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 840
(1938) (originally enacted as Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 561 (1898) (repealed by 11
U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)))).
13. Snider, supra note 12, at 35. The Code fails to provide the bankruptcy court with standards
to consider when determining whether to appoint an examiner. Id. at 36.
14. In 1988, Revco D.S., Inc. filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Revco Files Amended Plan in Bid to
Stay Independent, Reuters, Jan. 22, 1992 (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File). The
company filed bankruptcy only two years after going private in an LBO. Id. In 1990, the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio appointed an examiner to investigate the LBO.
Revco Revisited, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 13, 1992, at 30. Revco was the first case in which a bankruptcy
court ordered the appointment of an examiner to investigate an LBO transaction. Revco Bankruptcy
Examiner Finds Basis for Legal Claims Against Management, Advisors and Lenders, PR Newswire,
Jan. 2, 1991 (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PR News File).
After an unsuccessful LBO, Interco, Inc. filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy in January 1991. Kim
Foltz, Business People, Difficult Task Described by Examiner of Interco, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1991,
at 35. In March 1991, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Missouri appointed an
examiner to investigate Interco's LBO. Id.
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LBOs increases in importance. Part I examines the statutory language
and legislative history of the Code's section 1104(b), which provides two
alternative methods for the bankruptcy court to appoint an examiner in a
reorganization case. Part II analyzes the judicial controversy and hostil-
ity surrounding section 1104(b) of the Code. Part III investigates the
statutory language and judicial development of the duties, powers and
role of an examiner in a failed LBO case. Finally, Part IV argues that
Congress should revise the Code to reflect its policy of efficient adminis-
tration of business reorganizations. In the absence of congressional res-
cue, the bankruptcy courts should formulate more appropriate guidelines
for an examiner's role in a failed LBO case. This Note concludes that the
nature of the economic climate and the increasing volume of Chapter 11
cases necessitate either revision of the provisions regarding examiners or
a more liberal judicial approach to examiners, who serve as cost-effective
alternatives to trustees.
I. APPOINTMENT OF EXAMINERS-STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197815 to overhaul
the bankruptcy system in the United States.' 6 The new Bankruptcy
Code repealed the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.1' In section 1104(b), the
Code provides two alternative methods for the appointment of examin-
ers.18 However, the statutory language regarding the appointment of ex-
aminers is ambiguous. 9 In addition, only scant legislative history exists
15. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988)).
16. See 1 ALAN N. RESNICK & EUGENE N. WYPYSKI, BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978:
A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY at preface (1979) (describing the Bankruptcy Act as the most significant
bankruptcy law development in the United States in recent decades).
17. See Robert E. Ginsburg, Introduction to the Symposium: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 - A Primer, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 923 (1979). The new bankruptcy laws introduced vast re-
forms in bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at 923. The new Chapter 11 for business reorganizations
combined Chapters X, XI, and XII into one single chapter. Id. at 928. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101- 1174
(1988). The former Bankruptcy Act provided Chapter X (Corporate Reorganizations) for public
company reorganizations, Chapter XI (Arrangements) for smaller business reorganizations, and
Chapter XII (Real Property Arrangements). Robert J. Berdan & Bruce G. Arnold, Displacing the
Debtor in Possession: The Requisites for and Advantages of the Appointment of a Trustee in Chapter
11 Proceedings, 67 MARQ. L. REv. 457, 457-58 (1984). The consolidation of the three chapters into
one integrated chapter represented one of the most significant reforms of the new Code. Id. at 457
n.2.
18. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1104(b)(1), 1104(b)(2) (1988).
19. See infra note 22 for text of § 1104(b).
[Vol. 70:821
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for sections 1104(b)(1) and 1104(b)(2). 20 Thus, courts vary in interpret-
ing the two sections regarding discretionary and mandatory appointment
of examiners in business reorganization cases.21
Under section 1104(b)(1), the Bankruptcy Code provides that the
bankruptcy court shall order the appointment of an examiner if it is in
the best interests of the creditors, any equity holders, or other parties in
interest in the estate.22 Alternatively, under section 1104(b)(2), the Code
provides that the bankruptcy court should grant a request to appoint an
examiner in any case in which the debtor's specific, statutorily enumer-
ated liabilities exceed five million dollars. Congress drafted the statutory
language of section 1104(b) as the result of last minute compromise.23
The legislators based the provision on the position that the examiner held
in cases filed under Chapter X of the former Bankruptcy Act.24
20. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
21. See infra Part II for a discussion of a judicial reaction to § 1104(b).
22. Section 1104 (b) provides:
(b) If the court does not order the appointment of a trustee under this section, then at any
time before the confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States
trustee, and after notice and a hearing, the court shall order the appointment of an exam-
iner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate, including an investiga-
tion of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement, or
irregularity in the management of the affairs of the debtor of or by current or former
management of the debtor, if-
(1) such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and
other interests of the estate [;or]
(2) the debtor's fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts, other than debts for goods, services,
or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5,000,000.
11 U.S.C. § 1104(b) (1988).
23. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11104.03 at 1104-40 (15th ed. 1987). The drafters intended
to appease those legislators who favored retaining the multi-chapter reorganization system of the old
Bankruptcy Act. Lawrence P. King & Susan K. Bart, Appointment of Examiner, in CRITIQUE OF
THE FIRsT DECADE UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND AGENDA FOR REFORM 341, 344 (ALI-
ABA Williamsburg Conference on Bankruptcy 1988). The drafters attempted to appease those who
favored retention of the former Bankruptcy Act's dual reorganization scheme. Id. The Act pro-
vided for one system of bankruptcy reorganizations for companies holding public debt or equity
holders and a separate system for non-public companies. Id. See Berdan & Arnold, supra note 17,
at 466 n.35 (explaining that numerous organizations and individuals influenced the synthesis of the
chapters into one integrated chapter).
24. Snider, supra note 12, at 35. In 1898, Congress enacted Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act.
See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 561 (1898) (amended by Chandler Act, 52 Stat. 840
(1938) (repealed by 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988))). Chapter X established the reorganization pro-
cess for corporations with complicated debt structures and many stockholders. King & Bart, supra
note 23, at 344-45 (citing In re GHR Cos., 43 B.R. 165, 171-72 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984), aff'd, 792
F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1986)). In contrast, Congress also enacted Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act for
reorganizing individuals or small businesses with few, if any, stockholders.
Under § 156 of Chapter X of the former Bankruptcy Act, Congress required the court to appoint
a trustee whenever the debtor's indebtedness exceeded $250,000. Snider, supra note 12, at 35 n.3
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Section 1104(b)'s legislative history is entrenched in controversy. 25 It
offers courts virtually no insight into the discretionary appointment of an
examiner under section 1104(b)(1). 26 In addition, the Bankruptcy Code
provides very little information about mandatory appointment pursuant
to section 1104(b)(2).2
Congress enacted the discretionary standard for the appointment of an
examiner to investigate allegations of fraud, dishonesty, or mismanage-
ment without displacing the current management. 2  The drafters in-
tended to allow courts "greater flexibility" in handling the debtor during
the reorganization process.29 Specifically, the drafters wanted to avoid
the mandatory trustee presumption which existed under Chapter X of
the former Bankruptcy Act." In adopting a flexible standard for the
appointment of an examiner when the creditors' or equity holders' inter-
ests require an investigation, the drafters of the new Code intended to
promote the increased use of an examiner.31 However, Congress failed to
establish criteria for the courts to follow when appointing examiners. 32
Because the statutory language does not provide clear standards,
(citing Chandler Act, § 156, 52 Stat. 888 (1938) (repealed 1978)). See also 5 COLLIER ON BANK-
Ruprcy 1104.01[2] at 1104-4 (15th ed. 1987). Chapter X Rule 10-202(a) required the court to
appoint a trustee whenever the liquidated, noncontingent debts in the case equalled or exceeded
$250,000. Id. If the debtor's debts totaled less than $250,000, the court could exercise its discretion
to appoint a trustee. Id. Alternatively, Chapter X authorized the court to retain the debtor-in-
possession and appoint an examiner to fulfill enumerated duties. Snider, supra note 12, at 35 n.3.
However, very few debtors with less than $250,000 debt filed cases under Chapter X. Id. Thus, the
court almost always appointed a trustee under the mandatory provision. King & Bart, supra note
23, at 5. Because courts routinely appointed trustees, they rarely appointed examiners under Chap-
ter X of the prior Act. Id. In addition, the former Bankruptcy Act contained no provisions regard-
ing the appointment of an examiner in Chapter XI cases. King & Bart, supra note 23, at 5.
25. Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REv.
941, 942 (1979). In 1970, Congress formed a commission to study and analyze the bankruptcy laws
in the United States. Id. at 942-43 (citing Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468
(1970)). After numerous changes and revisions during the debates in the House and Senate, Con-
gress enacted a new bankruptcy system eight years later. Berdan & Arnold, supra note 17, at 457
n.2. For a general description of the organization of the Code, see Ginsburg, supra note 17.
26. See infra note 32 and accompanying text.
27. Snider, supranote 12, at 35-36.
28. King & Bart, supra note 23, at 343.
29. Id. (quoting House Report, supra note 10, at 6359).
30. House Report, supra note 10, at 6191-94. See supra note 24 for an explanation of ap-
pointing a trustee under Chapter X -of the former Bankruptcy Act.
31. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
32. King & Bart, supra note 23, at 1. See also Snider, supra note 12, at 36. Neither the
Bankruptcy Code nor its legislative history offers standards for a court to consider when determining
whether to appoint an examiner under § 1104(b)(1). Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/5
1992] BANKRUPTCY EXAMINERS IN LEVERAGED BUYOUTS
courts refer to the Code's legislative history for guidance. However, the
legislative history of section 1104(b)(1) fails to define or clarify the stan-
dards of discretionary appointment of an examiner in a reorganization
case. The legislative history surrounding the controversial "mandatory"
appointment provision of section 1104(b)(2) offers a little more insight
into the drafters' intentions.3 Section 1104(b)(2)'s language, specifically
the use of the words "bankruptcy court shall," appears to require the
bankruptcy court to appoint an examiner when the debtor's debts exceed
five million dollars.34 The product of legislative compromise, the section
resulted from the House and Senate each introducing separate bills dur-
ing the Bankruptcy Code's formulation.35 Specifically, the House and
Senate approached the revision of corporate reorganizations of "public
companies" differently.36
The House bill, H.R. 8200,"7 provided that if the court chose not to
appoint a trustee, it could appoint an examiner.38 H.R. 8200 authorized
the appointment of an examiner to investigate the debtor if: (1) an exam-
iner was needed; and (2) the costs of the examiner did not disproportion-
ately exceed the benefits to the estate.39  The House bill favored
33. Snider, supra note 12, at 41. See also House Report, supra note 10, at 6359.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)(2) (1988). See supra note 22 for the text of§ 1104(b)(2). In order for a
bankruptcy court to appoint an examiner pursuant to § 1104(b)(2), a party in interest or the United
States Trustee must request the examiner. Id. Cf. In re UNR Indus., 72 B.R. 789 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1987) (appointing an examiner sua sponte).
35. Snider, supra note 12, at 41.
36. See infra note 39 for text of H.R. 8200; see infra note 44 for text of S. 2266. See also King
& Bart, supra note 23, at 348; Snider, supra note 12, at 41; Berdan & Arnold, supra note 17, at 466
nn.35-36. In the 1970s, Congress established the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States to investigate a complete reform of the bankruptcy system. Klee, supra note 25, at
943. See also Act of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 894 Stat. 468 (1970).
The Commission consisted of nine members, three of whom the President appointed. Klee, supra
note 25, at 943. The House, Senate and the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court each
appointed two members. Id. Both the House and Senate considered the Commission's findings and
recommendations before introducing H.R. 8200 and S. 2266. See H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978), reprinted in 16 RESNICK & WYPYSKI, supra note 16, at Doc. 51 [hereinafter H.R. 8200]; S.
2266, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1977), reprinted in 16 RESNICK & WYPYSKI, supra note 16, at Doc. 53
[hereinafter S. 2266].
37. H.R. 8200, supra note 36.
38. Id.
39. Id. As adopted by the House, § 1104(b) of H.R. 8200 provided:
If the court does not order the appointment of a trustee under this section, then at any time
before the commencement of a plan, on request of a party in interest or the United States
Trustee, and after notice and a hearing the court may order the appointment of an exam-
iner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate, including an investiga-
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discretionary appointment of a trustee or examiner.' Yet, the House
recognized that appointing an examiner constituted a less restrictive al-
ternative than displacing the debtor with a trustee.41
Compared to H.R. 8200, the Senate bill, S. 2266,42 was a more con-
servative approach to the reform of corporate reorganizations.43 Section
1104(a) of the Senate bill retained the mandatory appointment of a
trustee in all public company reorganizations consistent with the former
Bankruptcy Act." The Senate introduced section 1104(c), which al-
lowed the court to appoint an examiner in a non-public reorganization
only if the requesting party showed "cause." ' 45 The Senate favored the
tion of any allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the
debtor of or by current or former management of the debtor, if-
(1) the protection afforded by an examiner is needed; and
(2) the costs and expenses of an examiner would not be disproportionately higher than
the value of the protection afforded.
H.R. 8200, supra note 36, at 183.
40. The drafters refused to mandate that a court appoint a trustee or examiner. See House
Report, supra note 10, at 6192-93.
41. House Report, supra note 10, at 6193. The House of Representatives acknowledged that
appointing an examiner was less restrictive than displacing the debtor with a trustee. Id. Further-
more, the House recognized that the court should only appoint an examiner when the benefits of his
investigations outweighed the costs associated with his appointment. Id. at 6194. See also Snider,
supra note 12, at 41. See also King & Bart, supra note 23, at 359.
42. S. 2266, supra note 36.
43. Section 1104(a) of S. 2266 provided: "In the case of a public company, the court, within
ten days after the entry of an order for relief under this chapter, shall appoint a disinterested
trustee." S. 2266, supra note 36, at 512. Section 1104(b) of the Senate bill provided for appointment
of a trustee in the case of a nonpublic company for cause if such appointment would be in the
interests of the estate and security holders. Id. at 513.
44. S. 2266, supra note 36. Section 1104(c) of S. 2266 provided:
If the court does not order the appointment of a trustee under this section, then at any time
before the confirmation of a plan, on request of a party in interest and after notice and a
hearing, the court for cause shown may order the appointment of an examiner to conduct
an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate, including such an investigation of any
allegations of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of the debtor or
by the current or former management of the debtor. The court shall order the appointment
of an examiner if such appointment would serve the interests of the estate and security
holders.
S. 2266, supra note 36, at 513.
45. Snider, supra note 12, at 42. Unlike the House, the Senate refused to eliminate the safe-
guards that it expected a trustee to provide public investors during the reorganization. Id. See also
King & Bart, supra note 23, at 353. The Senate declined to explain its reasoning for introducing
§ 1104(c). Id. at 354. The Senate introduced two standards to govern a trustee's appointment,
depending upon whether the debtor was a public or nonpublic company, not whether the debtor was
small or large. Id. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5795-96 [hereinafter Senate Report]. "[I]nvestor protection is most critical
when the company in which the public invested is in financial difficulties and is forced to seek relief
under the bankruptcy laws." Id. at 5796.
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use of trustees instead of examiners,' while the House preferred
examiners.47
Congress eliminated section 1104(c) of the Senate bill when it finally
enacted the new bankruptcy system in 1978.48 The drafters deleted sec-
tion 1104(c) 4 9 in order to gain the support of the Securities and Exchange
Commission." Congress replaced section 1104(c) with section
1104(b)(2)5" to appease those who feared that public investors would suf-
fer when a large company declared Chapter 11 bankruptcy.52
Section 1104(b)(2) appears to provide for mandatory appointment of
an examiner in all Chapter 11 cases where the court has declined to ap-
point a trustee, and the debtor's unsecured liabilities exceed five million
dollars. 3  Alternatively, section 1104(b)(1) provides for discretionary
46. See Notes of Senate Committee on the Judiciary, S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978), reprinted in BANKRUPTCY CODE, RULES AND OFFICIAL FORMS: LAW SCHOOL AND C.L.E.
EDITION § 1104 at 288 (West 1986). Section 1104(a) of S. 2266 provides for the mandatory appoint-
ment of a disinterested trustee. Id. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
47. See Notes of House Committee on the Judiciary, H. R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1977), reprinted in BANKRUPTCY CODE, RULES AND OFFICIAL FORMS: LAW SCHOOL AND C.L.E.
EDITION § 1104(a) at 288 (West 1986).
48. Section 1104(a) of S. 2266 provided for the mandatory appointment of a trustee in all public
company reorganization cases. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
49. Snider, supra note 12, at 42. Congress substituted the $5 million provision of § 1104(b)(2)
for the provision of S. 2666 § 1104(a) mandating the appointment of trustees in public company
reorganization cases. Id. at 42-43. The drafters of the compromise bill also deleted the requirement
that the court consider the costs associated with the appointment of an examiner. King & Bart,
supra note 23, at 24 n.41 (citing 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY % 1104.03[3] (15th ed. 1987)).
50. Aaron Levy, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Judicial Func-
tions under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 29, 29-34 (1980). The SEC
favored retaining the protection that a mandatory trustee afforded stockholders of large public cor-
porations under Chapter X of the former Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 30. See Hearings Before the Sub-
committee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
622 (1977).
51. The drafters designed § 1 104(b)(2) to provide for the mandatory appointment of examiners
in all cases where debtor's unsecured liabilities exceeded $5 million. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)(2)
(1988). But see infra notes 114-28 and accompanying text.
52. Snider, supra note 12, at 42-43. Acknowledging concern for public investors, Rep. Ed-
wards explained Congress's reasons for enacting a mandatory appointment provision for examiners
in all cases where certain enumerated liabilities of the debtor exceeded $5 million:
In order to insure that adequate investigation of the debtor is conducted to determine fraud
or wrongdoing on the part of present management, an examiner is required to be appointed
in all cases in which the debtor's fixed, liquidated, and unsecured debts, other than debts
for goods, services, or taxes, or owing to an insider, exceed $5 million. This should ade-
quately represent the needs of public security holders in most cases.
Snider, supra note 12, at 43 n.29 (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 32,403 (1978) (statement of Rep.
Edwards)).
53. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)(2) (1988). Although the language implies mandatory appoint-
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appointment, based on the best interests of creditors, equity holders, and
other interests of the estate, when the debtor's liabilities are less than five
million dollars.5 4 Yet, some courts and scholars have vehemently re-
jected the statutory language and legislative history.5 These courts ap-
plied different standards when determining whether to appoint an
examiner in certain cases. 56
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1104(b)
A. Discretionary Appointment of Section 1104(b)(1)
Under section 1104(b)(1)'s discretionary standard of appointment, the
bankruptcy court should appoint an examiner when the interests of the
estate or creditors require the examiner's investigation.57 The Bank-
ruptcy Code offers no guidance concerning which circumstances justify
the discretionary appointment of an examiner.5 8 Thus, courts vary in
determining the standards for such appointment. 9 Several courts have
concluded that the standards governing the appointment of an examiner
are identical to those regarding the appointment of a trustee.60 Other
courts have established a less stringent standard when deciding whether
to appoint an examiner.61
L Standards Identical to Trustees
Section 1104 provides one provision for the appointment of trustees
and a separate section to govern the appointment of examiners. 62  De-
ment, some courts have interpreted the language as non-mandatory. See, e.g., In re GHR Cos., 43
B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984), aff'd, 792 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1986). See also infra part II.B.2.
54. See supra note-22.
55. See infra part II.
56. King & Bart, supra note 23, at 366 n.41. See also infra part II.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b)(1) (1988). See supra note 22 for text of § 1104(b)(l).
58. See Snider, supra note 12, at 36.
59. Id.
60. See, eg., In re Table Talk, Inc., 22 B.R. 706 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982); In re American Bulk
Transp. Co., 8 B.R. 337 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
61. See, eg., In re Gilman Servs., Inc., 46 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); In re 1243 20th
St., Inc., 6 B.R. 683 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1980).
62. Section 1104(a) provides for the appointment of a trustee:
(a) At any time after the commencement of the case but before confirmation of a plan, on
request of a party in interest or the United States trustee, and after notice and a hearing,
the court shall order the appointment of a trustee-
(1) for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement of
the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after the commencement
[Vol. 70:821
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spite this distinction,63 in In re American Bulk Transport Co.," the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas concluded that identical
standards govern the appointment of trustees and examiners.65 Simi-
larly, in In re Table Talk, Inc., 66 the Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Massachusetts held that the standards for the appointment of an ex-
aminer match those applicable to the appointment of a trustee.67 In ad-
dition, in In re Tyler,68 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District
of Florida held that because the appointment of a trustee did not serve
the interests of creditors under section 1104(a)(2), the appointment of an
examiner did not serve the interests of creditors within the meaning of
section 1104(b)(1). 69
In determining that identical criteria existed for determining whether
to appoint a trustee or an examiner, these courts focused on the nearly
indistinguishable language in sections 1104(a) and 1104(b)(1). 7° How-
ever, the courts did not consider the differences between the roles of the
of the case, or similar cause, but not including the number of holders of securities of the
debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor; or
(2) if such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and
other interests of the estate, without regard to the number of holders of securities of the
debtor or the amount of assets or liabilities of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988). For the text of § 1104(b) providing for the appointment of an examiner,
see supra note 22.
63. Section 1104(a) provides that the court shall appoint a trustee (1) for cause, or (2) if such
appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security holders, and other interests of the
estate. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988). See supra note 62. Section 1104(b) provides that the court shall
appoint an examiner (1) if such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity security
holders, and other interests of the estate, or (2) if the debtor's fixed, liquidated, unsecured debts
exceed $5 million. Id. § 1104(b).
64. 8 B.R. 337 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
65. American Bulk, 8 B.R. at 341.
66. 22 B.R. 706 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
67. Table Talk, 22 B.R. at 710.
68. 18 B.R. 574 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982).
69. Tyler, 18 B.R. at 578-79. "Subsection (1) of [§ 1104](b) is similar to subsection (2) of
§ 1104(a)." Id. at 578. In Tyler, the court concluded that a trustee was not in the creditors' best
interests. Id. The court reasoned that a trustee was unnecessary because the moving party failed to
demonstrate that the debtor's management was disloyal or committed any wrongdoing. Id. The
court discounted both the management's complex interpersonal and intercorporate cash transactions
and its post-commencement use of a bank account to "float" funds. Id. at 576. The court further
noted that § 1104(b)(2) did not mandate an examiner because the debtor's unsecured liabilities did
not exceed $5 million. Id. at 578-79.
70. See supra note 62. See also Snider, supra note 12, at 37. The "for cause" language in
§ I 104(a)(1) creates a presumption that displacing management by appointing a trustee is not in the
creditors' best interests. Id. In contrast to a trustee's appointment, a court should not infer that
§ 1104(b)(l) creates the presumption that an examiner is adverse to the creditors' interests. Id.
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trustee and examiner. While courts routinely acknowledge that ap-
pointing a trustee is an extraordinary remedy, which displaces the debtor
and drains the bankruptcy estate of much-needed assets, 71 the appoint-
ment of an examiner produces less cumbersome consequences to the
debtor, the creditors and the estate.72
2. Factual Basis Standard
Other courts apply a lesser standard for the appointment of an exam-
iner.73 In In re 1243 20th Street, Inc. ,' the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Columbia appointed an examiner when sufficient evidence
supported allegations of the debtor's possible mismanagement or miscon-
duct.75 The court held that a debtor's suspicious transfers of corporate
funds warranted the appointment of an examiner. 76 Similarly, in In re
Gilman Services, Inc. , the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massa-
chusetts appointed an examiner under section 1104(b)(1) when the
debtor's misconduct supported the need for an independent investigation
by an examiner.78  The court found that the debtor's pre-bankruptcy sale
71. Tyler, 18 B.R. at 577. Authorities agree that the appointment of a trustee is an "extraordi-
nary remedy." Id.
72. Snider, supra note 12, at 37. The examiner is "less intrusive" to the debtor. Id. For
example, the debtor's management continues to operate the business despite the examiner's appoint-
ment. Id. In contrast, a court-appointed trustee ousts the debtor's management. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1101, 1108 (1988).
73. See, eg., In re Tyler, 18 B.R. 574, 577 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (requiring clear and con-
vincing evidence to support the appointment of a trustee or an examiner); In re Lenihan, 4 B.R. 209,
212 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1980) (refusing to appoint an examiner until the evidence illustrates that he is
necessary); In re Bel Air Assocs., 6 B.R. 284 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1980) (arguing that mere naked
allegations of fraud or mismanagement are insufficient to warrant the examiner's appointment; alle-
gations must have at least some factual basis).
74. 6 B.R. 683 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1980).
75. 1243 20th St., 6 B.R. at 686.
76. Id. at 685-86. The court found that the debtor's related corporations did not, per se, consti-
tute a factual basis for the examiner's appointment. Id. at 685. However, the debtor's transfer of
funds to another entity under its control convinced the court to order the examiner to investigate the
debtor's activities. Id.
77. 46 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
78. Gilman Sers., 46 B.R. at 327. The court ordered an examiner to investigate unexplained
losses of assets occurring after the commencement of the bankruptcy case. Id. at 328.
Three years earlier, in In re Table Talk, Inc., 22 B.R. 706 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982), the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Massachusetts held that the standards for appointing a trustee are identical
to those for an examiner. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text. The Gilman Sers court
did not mention the standard previously articulated in Table Talk. In both Gilman Sers. and Table
Talk, the debtors failed to accurately report pertinent financial information. Gilman Sers., 46 B.R.
at 328; Table Talk, 22 B.R. at 711. In Table Talk, the court denied the motion to appoint an
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of assets to a related corporation constituted sufficient cause to appoint
an examiner. 79 In addition, the court concluded that the debtor's failure
to file accurate financial statements during the reorganization necessi-
tated the examiner's investigation.'0
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis Standard
When determining if the "interest of creditors" of section 1104(b)(1)
includes the appointment of an examiner,81 several courts have consid-
ered a cost-benefit analysis. These courts appoint an examiner only when
the benefits to the interested parties outweigh the cost and delay associ-
ated with the examiner's investigations. In In re Gilman Services, 82 the
bankruptcy court granted the creditors' motion to appoint an examiner
to investigate the debtor's post-filing transactions.83 The court concluded
that the benefit to both the estate and the protection the examiner's in-
vestigation offered to creditors and the estate outweighed the expense and
delay of his appointment.8
In contrast, in In re American Bulk Transport Co.,8" the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Kansas declined to appoint an examiner to in-
vestigate the debtor's post-commencement transactions and untimely an-
examiner. 22 B.R. at 713. In contrast, in Gilman Servs, the court granted the motion. 46 B.R. at
329. In Table Talk, the creditors' committee previously hired an auditor to investigate the debtor.
22 B.R. at 710. Although each court purportedly adopted a different standard to govern the ap-
pointment of an examiner, perhaps the costs associated with the examiner's investigations actually
motivated the Table Talk court. See Table Talk, 22 B.R. at 711 ("It is not clear... precisely what
it is that the creditors' committee wants an examiner to ascertain that [the auditor] is not capable of
doing.").
79. Gilman Serys., 46 B.R. at 327.
80. Id. The court also ordered the examiner to investigate certain deficiencies in the debtor's
records, certain transfers of real estate, and potential litigation pursuant to the fraudulent transfers
of the real estate. Id. at 328.
81. See supra note 22.
82. 46 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
83. Gilman Servs., 46 B.R. at 329.
84. Id. at 327-28. When the examiner's appointment does not deplete the estate, the delay
which accompanies his investigation is not detrimental. Id. at 328 (citing In re Shelter Resources
Corp., 35 B.R. 304 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983)). See also In re Hamiel & Sons, Inc., 20 B.R. 830, 832
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) ("[A] court must weigh cost/benefit considerations and a cost/protection
analysis before the appointment of either a trustee or examiner."). Cf. Snider, supra note 12, at 38
(explaining that although courts often consider costs and benefits, the legislative history arguably
supports the opposite conclusion because the final version of § 1104(b)(1) deleted the express provi-
sion of H.R. 8200 calling for a cost/benefit inquiry). See supra note 39.
85. 8 B.R. 337 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
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nual reports filings.86 The court held that to appoint an examiner, the
court must find that the examiner's costs and expenses are not "dispro-
portionately high."87
Similar to American Bulk, in In re Table Talk, 8 the court denied the
appointment of an examiner.8 9 The court first concluded that the stan-
dards for appointment of an examiner are identical to those for the ap-
pointment of a trustee.90 The Table Talk court ruled that a court should
only grant a motion for a trustee or examiner when his expenses do not
disproportionately impose a burden on the bankruptcy estate.91
B. Mandatory Appointment of Examiners - Section 1104(b)(2)
Although the legislative history and statutory language of section
1104(b)(2) provide that a court must appoint an examiner when the
debtor's specified liabilities exceed five million dollars, courts do not
unanimously agree that section 1104(b)(2) requires such an appointment.
Even when the debtor met the debt level of section 1104(b)(2), some
courts have refused to appoint an examiner.
1. "Mandatory" Appointment
To date, In re Revco D.S., Inc. is the only LBO case addressing the
issue of the appointment of an examiner.92 In Revco, the Sixth Circuit
reversed the bankruptcy court's ruling that section 1104(b)(2) does not
impose an affirmative duty upon the bankruptcy court to order an exam-
iner's appointment when the debt exceeds five million dollars.93  The
86. American Bulk, 8 B.R. at 341-42.
87. Id. at 341 (citing House Report, supra note 10, at 6359).
88. 22 B.R. 706 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1982).
89. Table Talk, 22 B.R. at 713.
90. Id. at 710. See supra notes 66, 67 and 78.
91. Table Talk, 22 B.R. at 710. The court cited H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6359 ("[P]rotection must be needed and the costs and
expenses must not be disproportionately high. . ."). Table Talk, 22 B.R. at 710. In reaching its
conclusion, the court noted that the House Report emphasized the protection and costs associated
with an examiner. Table Talk, 22 B.R. at 710. The court's reliance on this language is questionable.
When Congress finally enacted § 1104(b) in 1978, it deleted the "protection" and "cost" language of
the House Report. See supra note 84.
92. 898 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1990). Revco D.S., Inc., operated 1150 drug stores in the United
States. Revco Files Amended Plan in Bid to Stay Independent, supra note 14. The company took
itself private in a $1.25 billion LBO in 1986. Id. The debt-stricken company earned the distinction
of becoming the first of the billion-dollar LBOs of the 1980s to seek bankruptcy protection from its
creditors. Revco Revisited, supra note 14. In June 1988, Revco filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Id.
93. Revco, 898 F.2d at 500-01. In Revco, the Sixth Circuit reversed In re Revco, D.S., Inc., 93
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Sixth Circuit held that section 1 104(b)(2) requires mandatory appoint-
ment when the United States Trustee or a party in interest requests an
examiner and the debtor's unsecured, fixed, and liquidated liabilities ex-
ceed five million dollars.94
In Revco, the debtor owned a national chain of drug stores.95 The
debtor formed a holding company and acquired all of its outstanding
shares of common stock in a leveraged buyout.96 The LBO failed, forc-
ing the debtor to seek Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. 97 The debtor
unpersuasively claimed that mandatory appointment of an examiner in-
vited abuse of the bankruptcy system and needlessly delayed confirming
a reorganization plan.98 The court focused on the "ordinary, contempo-
rary, common meaning"99 of the word "shall" in the statute. 10 The
court concluded that unless section 1104(b)(2) required mandatory ap-
B.R. 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) [hereinafter Revco I]. In Revco I, the United States Trustee
moved for the appointment of an examiner to investigate the LBO. Revco I, 93 B.R. at 120. The
bankruptcy court held that § 1104(bX2) does not mandate the appointment, even when debtor's
unsecured debt exceeds S5 million. Id. at 126. The court based its reasoning on other recent deci-
sions in which other courts held that § 1104(b)(2) does not require mandatory appointment. Id. at
124-25. See In re GHR Cos., 43 B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984), aff'd, 792 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.
1986); In re Shelter Resources Corp., 35 B.R. 304 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).
In Revco I, the bankruptcy court denied the motion to appoint an examiner. 93 B.R. at 126. The
bankruptcy court concluded that appointing an examiner would duplicate services and impose un-
necessary fees upon the debtor's estate. Id. In addition, the court found that the examiner's ap-
pointment would hinder the debtor's merchandising activities. Id. The court reasoned that the
examiner was unnecessary because the creditors' committee previously had hired accountants and
auditors to investigate the debtor's activities. Id. at 126.
94. Revco, 898 F.2d at 501. When the U.S. Trustee moved for the appointment of an examiner,
he did not allege or prove that an examiner was warranted for "cause" under the discretionary
appointment standard of § 1 104(bX)1). Revco 1, 93 B.R. at 124. Thus, the court only considered the
appointment under § 1104(b)(2). Id.
95. Revco, 898 F.2d at 499. See also Revco Files Amended Plan in Bid to Stay Independent,
supra note 14 (Revco, based in Twinsburg, Ohio, operated 1150 drug stores).
96. Revco, 898 F.2d at 499. The holding company acquired the outstanding shares of Revco's
common stock in a typical leveraged buyout transaction. See generally Neely, supra note 7, at 572-
73.
97. Revco, 898 F.2d at 499. Only two years after the LBO, the reorganized company filed for
bankruptcy protection. See Sherry R. Sontag, Revco Battle Revs Up for Court Hearing, NAT'L L.J.,
Jan. 13, 1992, at 1.
98. Revco, 898 F.2d at 501. The debtor asserted that if a party in interest demanded an exam-
iner pursuant to § 1104(b)(2) at the last minute, that creditor would create a needless delay for the
reorganization. Id.
99. Revco, 898 F.2d at 500 (citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
100. See supra note 22 for the language of § 1 104(b)(2). The court also emphasized that "shall"
is defined as a "word of command and one which.., must be given a compulsory meaning." Id. at
501 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1233 (5th ed. 1979)).
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pointment of an examiner, the section was identical to section 1104(b)(1)
and was superfluous. 10 1 Ordering an examiner's mandatory appoint-
ment,10 2 the bankruptcy court reasoned that its broad discretion over the
examiner's duties and powers removed any risk of potential abuse posed
by last minute demands for an examiner.103  The court completely ig-
nored the debtor's claims that the examiner constituted a needless ex-
pense and a drain on the estate.1 4
Similar to Revco, courts in other bankruptcy cases 0" have held that
section 1104(b)(2) mandates the appointment of an examiner whenever
the debtor satisfies the five million dollar debt threshold.106 In In re 1243
20th Street, Inc. , o7 the court considered the discretionary appointment
of an examiner under section 1104(b)(1). 108 In dictum, the court as-
101. Revco, 898 F.2d at 501. The court found that the contrast between § 1104(b)(1) and
§ 1 104(b)(2) "could not be more striking." Id.
102. Id. On remand, the Sixth Circuit ordered the bankruptcy court to appoint an examiner
pursuant to § 1104(b)(2) of the Code. Id. In June 1990, the bankruptcy court appointed the exam-
iner. Revco Revisited, supra note 14, at 30.
103. Revco, 898 F.2d. at 501. The court declined to address the issues of potential abuse, unnec-
essary delay and inefficiency. Id. The court acknowledged only that the bankruptcy court may
direct an examiner's investigation under § 1104(b). Id. Section 1104(b) provides that the court
should appoint an examiner "to conduct such investigation of the debtor as is appropriate." 11
U.S.C. § 1104(b) (1988). On the issue of abuse, the court noted only that the Attorney General may
remove any U.S. Trustee from office. Revco, 898 F.2d at 501. See 28 U.S.C. § 581(c) (1988).
104. Revco, 898 F.2d. at 501. The bankruptcy court had already approved the creditors' com-
mittee's motion to appoint a private accounting firm to audit the LBO and the debtor. Id. at 499
n.l. Because most LBO cases are large reorganizations, courts commonly appoint accountants or
auditors to investigate the LBO or the debtor's transactions.
105. These bankruptcy cases do not involve failed LBOs.
106. For decisions holding that § 1104(b)(2) is mandatory in nature, see In re Bible Speaks, 74
B.R. 511, 514 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987); In re San Juan Hotel Corp., 71 B.R. 413, 418 n.3 (Bankr.
D.P.R. 1987) (holding that where debtor's fixed, liquidated and unsecured debts exceed five million
dollars, the court must appoint an examiner under § 1104(b)(2)); In re 1243 20th St., Inc., 6 B.R.
683, 685 n.3 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1980); In re Lenihan, 4 B.R. 209, 211 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1980) (holding
that the court is required to appoint an examiner).
In addition to these courts, some scholars have concluded that § 1104(b)(2) requires a court to
appoint an examiner whenever the debtor's fixed, liquidated, and unsecured debts exceed $5 million.
See Berdan & Arnold, supra note 17, at 462 n.19 ("[A]n examiner must be appointed" under
1104(b)(2)). Cf. HARVEY M. LEBowrrz, BANKRUpTcY DESKBOOK 300 (1986) (arguing that the
appointment of an examiner becomes mandatory not upon satisfying the $5 million debt level, but
only when the court finds it appropriate for an examiner to undertake an investigation under the
facts and circumstances of the case).
107. 6 B.R. 683 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1980).
108. 1243 20th St., 6 B.R. at 685-86. The court did not address the appointment of an examiner
under § 1104(b)(2). Id.
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sumed that section 1 104(b)(2) required an examiner's appointment. 109
Similar to 1243 20th Street, in In re Bible Speaks,110 the court addressed
whether to appoint a trustee or an examiner to investigate the debtor's
questionable behavior and management. 1" The court found that the
debtor's conduct justified appointing a trustee.11 2 Attempting to justify
the trustee's expense, the court posited that if it did not appoint a trustee,
it would have to appoint an examiner under section 1104(b)(2) because
the debtor's liabilities exceeded six million dollars.'
1 3
2. "Non-mandatory" Appointment
Despite section 1104(b)(2)'s language, several courts have refused to
appoint an examiner when the debtor's specified liabilities exceeded five
million dollars. In In re GHR Companies, Inc.,114 the United States
Trustee moved for the appointment of an examiner pursuant to section
1 104(b)(2) because the debtor's liabilities exceeded the statutorily defined
monetary threshold.' 15 The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Massa-
109. Id. at 685 n.3. ("It should be noted, of course, that the appointment of an examiner is
mandatory" under § 1104(b)(2)).
110. 74 B.R. 511 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987).
11I. Bible Speaks, 74 B.R. at 514. An allowed secured claimant, who held a claim of $6 million
against the debtor, moved for the trustee's appointment under § 1104(a). Id. at 511-12. Prior to the
bankruptcy and as a result of debtor's undue influence, the creditor donated $6 million to the
debtor's religious organization. Id. at 512. The court found that the debtor filed bankruptcy under
Chapter 11 primarily to avoid this creditor's claim. Id. In an effort to recoup some of his losses, the
creditor moved to appoint a trustee and displace the debtor. Id.
112. Id. at 514. The bankruptcy court appointed a trustee to curb the "costly and legalistic
bickering" between the creditor and the debtor. Id. at 512-14. The debtor and its counsel constantly
threatened to appeal the amount of the allowed secured claim "to the Supreme Court if necessary."
Id. at 513. In addition, the court found that the debtor's counsel desired to sabotage any possibility
of confirming a reorganization plan by arguing that confirmation of a plan was impossible because of
a lack of funds to pay debtor's accrued legal expenses. Id. The court determined that the debtor's
dishonesty merited the trustee's services. Id. at 513-14.
113. Id. at 514. The court assumed that the Code required it to appoint either a trustee or an
examiner if the court did not appoint a trustee because of the debtor's $6 million debt. Id. The
bankruptcy court reasoned that the estate faced substantial expense whether a trustee or an examiner
was appointed. Id. After concluding that an examiner lacked the requisite powers to accomplish an
effective reorganization, the court appointed a trustee. Id. Cf. Harvey R. Miller & Jaqueline Mar-
cus, The Crumbling Debtor Leverage in Chapter 11 Cases--An Implementation or Perversion of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, in THE FAILED LBO: How TO RESTRUCTURE THE TROUBLED
BusINESS UNDER CHAPTER 11, at 3, 24 (ALI-ABA Course of Study Materials 1990) (citing In re
A.H. Robins Co., No. 85-01307-R (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 1986), a case where a bankruptcy court
appointed an examiner with extremely broad powers).
114. 43 B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984), aff'd, 792 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1986).
115. GHR, 43 B.R. at 167. The U.S. Trustee moved for the appointment of an examiner in the
cases of six of eight affiliated private-company debtors, relying on § 1104(b)(1). Id. The United
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chusetts held that section 1104(b)(2) does not impose mandatory ap-
pointment.11 6 The court found that the Code did not provide a clear
expression of the rationale behind the mandatory examiner provision." 7
The court concluded that the legislative history failed to establish a con-
gressional intent to protect the creditors of privately-held corporations
such as the GHR debtors. I" Finding a contrasting congressional intent,
the GHR court reasoned that Congress enacted section 1104(b)(2) to
protect equity holders."1 9
Similar to GHR, in In re Shelter Resources Corp., 20 the Securities and
Exchange Commission and a substantial creditor,1 21 requested the ap-
pointment of an examiner to investigate the debtor.1 22 The Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied the motion.1 23 First, the
court found that the parties' settlement of the case mooted the arguments
favoring the need for an examiner to investigate a pending shareholder
derivative suit. 24 Second, the court noted that the fact that the debtor's
fixed, liquidated and unsecured liabilities exceeded five million dollars
constituted the SEC's only reason for requesting the examiner's appoint-
ment.125 Finally, the court concluded that the examiner's appointment
would delay administration of the reorganization and impose substantial,
States Trustee relied on § 1104(b)(2) in only one case. Id. The court did not decide the § 1104(b)(l)
issue. Id. at 176.
116. Id. at 170.
117. Id. at 175. The court reviewed the legislative history to determine that Congress intended
to protect creditors and equity security holders of public companies. Id. at 170. However, the court
found no congressional intent to protect privately held companies. Id. But see In re Revco, D.S.,
Inc., 898 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1990). In Revco, the Sixth Circuit rejected the bankruptcy court's
reliance on the GHR court's reasoning, and held that § 1104(b)(2) required an examiner's appoint-
ment in an LBO case where the debtor's liabilities exceeded $5 million. Id. at 501. See supra notes
92-104 and accompanying text.
118. GHR, 43 B.R. at 170. The court recognized that the legislative history did not mention the
number of equity holders as a prerequisite to mandatory appointment. Id. In addition, the court
found that the legislative history did not imply that the court must appoint an examiner in a nonpub-
lic corporate bankruptcy proceeding. Snider, supra note 12, at 43-44 (citing GHR, 43 B.R. at 175).
119. GHR, 43 B.R. at 170.
120. 35 B.R. 304 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).
121. Shelter Resources, 35 B.R. at 304. The Code allows any "party in interest" to seek ap-
pointment of an examiner. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b) (1988). Thus, the SEC did not need the creditors'
intervention before moving for the examiner's appointment. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a) ("The [SEC]
may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter .....
122. Shelter Resources, 35 B.R. at 304.
123. Id. at 305.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 303.
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unnecessary costs and burdens on the estate. 126  The court implicitly
found that when a bankruptcy court considers a motion to appoint an
examiner under section 1104(b)(2), the court should not merely consider
the amount of debt. 27 Indicating judicial hostility toward section
1104(b)(2), the court stated that "to slavishly and blindly follow the so-
called mandatory dictates of section 1104(b)(2) is needless, costly and
nonproductive and would impose a grave injustice on all parties."12
III. THE EXAMINER'S ROLE IN AN LBO BANKRUPTCY
REORGANIZATION
Once the bankruptcy court has approved the examiner's appointment,
the nature of the examiner's powers and duties determines his effective-
ness as an alternative to a trustee. As more failing LBOs burden the
bankruptcy courts with large, complex reorganizations,1 29 significant ju-
dicial controversy and uncertainty surrounds the scope of the examiner's
duties. In the large LBO context, the broader the examiner's powers, the
greater the effect on the creditors' committee, bankruptcy estate, and
other parties in interest in the reorganization.130
To date, no LBO cases have specifically addressed the issue of the ex-
panded role of the examiner. 31 Yet, several bankruptcy courts have ex-
126. Id. at 305. The court found no evidence of fraud, mismanagement, or irregularities by the
debtor's current management. Id. The court concluded that an examiner was unnecessary because it
had already appointed a committee with full investigative powers. Id.
127. Id. See also Snider, supra note 12, at 45 (arguing that a court should consider other facts
and circumstances before appointing an examiner).
128. Shelter Resources, 35 B.R. at 305. The court found that an examiner would serve no useful
or beneficial purpose. Id. The bankruptcy court concluded that an examiner would not further the
best interests of the estate. Id. The court's conclusion virtually collapsed §§ 1104(b)(1) and
1104(b)(2), rendering § 1104(b)(2) meaningless. See Snider, supra note 12, at 45.
129. See supra notes 2, 3. See also David Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20
GA. L. REV. 73 n.3 (1985) ("[Ihe more leveraged takeovers and buyouts today, the more bankrupt-
cies tomorrow.") (quoting John Shad, The Leveraging of America, Statement Before the New York
Financial Writers Ass'n (June 7, 1984), quoted in CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, SUBCOMM.
ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND FIN. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON EN-
ERGY AND COMMERCE, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., MERGER ACTIVITY AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS:
SOUND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING OR WALL STREET ALCHEMY? 5 (Comm. Print 1984)).
130. Neal Batson & Lee Brooks Rivera, Role of Creditors' Committees, in THE FAILED LBO
REVISITED: RESTRUCTURING TROUBLED BUSINESSES IN A RECESSION 47, 57 (ALI-ABA Course of
Study Materials 1991).
131. Although no LBO cases have confronted this exact issue, a recent LBO case addressed the
related issue of the meaning of the word "disinterested" under 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(13)(E), 1104(c). See
In re Interco, Inc., 127 B.R. 633, 638 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991) (holding that an examiner was "disin-
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panded an examiner's powers in non-LBO cases. 13 2  Future courts
attempting to define the parameters of an examiner's duties in the failed
LBO context must rely on ambiguous statutory language, minimal legis-
lative history, and non-LBO judicial decisions regarding examiners. Be-
cause the Code and the legislative history fail to define clearly the scope
of an examiner's powers, courts disagree on the issue of approving an
examiner with expanded powers.
When the court appoints an examiner under section 1104(b), the
Bankruptcy Code requires the examiner to investigate the debtor. 133 Sec-
tion 1106 provides that, unless the court orders otherwise, the examiner
must issue a report outlining fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, miscon-
duct, mismanagement, irregularity in management of the debtor's affairs
or in any cause of action available to the estate. 134 The legislative history
implies that Congress envisioned an examiner who possessed the trustee's
terested" within the meaning of the Code even though her law firm previously and contemporane-
ously handled unrelated legal matters for the debtor's investment banking firm).
In June 1990, the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Ohio appointed an independent
examiner to investigate the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Revco D.S., Inc. Revco Revisited, supra note
14, at 30. He was the first examiner ever appointed to investigate a billion dollar junk-bond-financed
LBO. Id. See supra note 93.
132. See In re Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 99 B.R. 177 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989); In re
Great Barrington Fair & Amusement, Inc., 53 B.R. 237, 241 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); In re Carnegie
Int'l Corp., 51 B.R. 252 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1984).
133. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b) (1988). Section 1104(b) provides that "the court shall order the ap-
pointment of an examiner to conduct such an investigation of the debtor as is appropriate, including
an investigation of any allegation of fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, misconduct, mismanagement,
or irregularity in the management of the affairs of the debtor...." Id.
134. Section 1106 of the Code provides:
(a) A trustee shall -
(3) except to the extent that the court orders otherwise, investigate the acts, conduct,
assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the operation of the debtor's busi-
ness and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and any other matter relevant
to the case or to the formulation of a plan;
(4) as soon as practicable -
(A) file a statement of any investigation conducted under paragraph (3) of this
subsection, including any fact ascertained pertaining to fraud, dishonesty, incompetence,
misconduct, mismanagement, or irregularity in the management of the affairs of the
debtor, or to a cause of action available to the estate; and
(B) transmit a copy or a summary of any such statement to any creditors' com-
mittee or equity security holders' committee, to any indenture trustee, and to such other
entity as the court designates;
(b) An examiner ... shall perform the duties specified in paragraphs (3) and (4) of sub-
section (a) of this section, and, except to the extent that the court orders otherwise, any
other duties of the trustee that the court orders the debtor in possession not to perform.
11 U.S.C. § 1106 (1988).
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investigative powers. 3 5 In addition, Congress intended bankruptcy
courts to have the flexibility to order additional duties for the exam-
iner. 36 Although most commentators believe that Congress did not in-
tend for sections 1104(b) and 1106(b) to authorize an examiner with
broad powers, courts are split on the issue.1 37 Some courts have author-
ized examiners with expansive powers, including the authority to operate
the debtor's business, file a confirmation plan, and initiate a lawsuit on
behalf of the debtor. In sharp contrast, other courts limit the examiner's
role to that of an investigator.
A. Expanded Role
In In re Carnegie International Corp. ,138 the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of Indiana extended the scope of the examiner's au-
thority. 39 Specifically, the court allowed the examiner to initiate a law-
suit on behalf of the estate.1 ° The court concluded that section 1106's
language and legislative history 41 empowered a bankruptcy court to ap-
point an examiner when a trustee would be inappropriate, and to assign
such examiner any of the trustee's duties. 42 First, the court discounted
the creditor's objection by stating that allowing an examiner to pursue
causes of action would not conflict with the examiner's statutorily de-
fined role.'4 3 The court determined that Congress intended to grant the
135. The legislative history indicates that Congress intended to give the trustee's investigative
duties to the examiner. King & Bart, supra note 23, at 367.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 368.
138. 51 B.R. 252 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1984).
139. Carnegie, 51 B.R. at 258.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 255-56. Noting the nearly identical language in §§ 1104 and 1106 of the Code, com-
pared to § 567 of the former Bankruptcy Act, the court reasoned that Congress intended to retain
the broad powers that the examiner possessed in Chapter X cases under the Act. Id. The court
concluded that Congress intended to vest the bankruptcy court with the power to extend an exam-
iner's duties beyond mere investigations. Id. at 255. But see King & Bart, supra note 23, at 347
(explaining that since the courts routinely appointed trustees in Chapter X cases, courts rarely ap-
pointed examiners).
142. Carnegie, 51 B.R. at 256.
143. Id. at 254. The objecting creditors contended that expanding the examiner's powers under-
mined the intent behind §§ 321(b) and 327(f). Id. Section 321(b) prohibits one who has served as
an examiner from serving as a trustee in the same case. Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 321(b) (1988). Simi-
larly, § 327(f) forbids the trustee from employing one who has served as an examiner in the case.
Carnegie, 51 B.R. at 256. See II U.S.C. § 327(f) (1988). The purpose underlying both sections is:
(1) to insure that the examiner conducts his investigations in an objective manner, and (2) to prevent
the examiner from filing an overly critical report anticipating that the court will hire him to litigate
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bankruptcy court discretion to expand the examiner's duties as circum-
stances mandate.144 The court vested the examiner with all of the powers
of a trustee to minimize expenses while deriving maximum benefit from
the resources expended. 145 Because the examiner already had completed
numerous hours of research and investigations, the court found that ap-
pointing a trustee, hiring special counsel, or authorizing the committees
to bring suit constituted needless expenses for the estate.
46
Similarly, in In re Public Service Company of New Hampshire,47 the
Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Hampshire appointed an ex-
aminer with broad powers. 148 The court appointed an examiner to serve
as a mediator in breaking an impasse between the parties in interest, re-
fusing to limit the examiner's role to investigations of fraud and other
irregularities. 49 In Public Service, the debtor, a large public utility com-
pany, handled intricate rate structures and complex regulatory matters in
the course of its business.' 50 The court appointed an examiner to medi-
ate the confirmation process of a reorganization plan, instruct the court
about utility regulatory matters, and assist in questioning expert wit-
actions arising out of the report. Carnegie, 51 B.R. at 254. The court noted that the creditors'
committees and equity holders moved jointly to expand the examiner's powers. Id. Thus, the court
found that appointing an examiner did not undermine the Code because the very parties Congress
intended to protect in §§ 321(b) and 327(f) agreed to expand the examiner's power. Id. at 254-55.
144. Carnegie, 51 B.R. at 255. Section 1106 "grants the court discretion to 'give the examiner
additional duties as the circumstances warrant.'" Id. (quoting House Report, supra note 10, at
6360; Senate Report, supra note 45, at 5902).
145. Carnegie, 51 B.R. at 256. The court expressed concern for the costs and benefits involved if
the court did not grant the examiner the power to initiate lawsuits on the estate's behalf. Id. If the
examiner could not bring the suits, the court would have to appoint a trustee or someone else to do
so, at great additional expense. Id. But cf In re Revco D.S., Inc., 898 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1990); In
re 1243 20th St., Inc., 6 B.R. 683 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1980). In both Revco and 1243 20th St., the courts
concluded that the Code requires a court to appoint an examiner whenever the debtor's liabilities
exceed $5 million. Id. These courts appointed an examiner, despite the possibility that he would
duplicate services that others previously investigated. See supra notes 92-109 and accompanying
text.
146. Carnegie, 51 B.R. at 256. The court authorized the examiner to initiate "litigation in order
to collect and reduce to money property of the estate in the form of causes of action which the estate
[held] against third parties." Id. at 254.
147. 99 B.R. 177 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1989).
148. Public Serv., 99 B.R. at 182.
149. Id. at 178, 182. In a large, complex reorganization of a public utility company, the debtor,
the creditors' committee, some equity holders, and the State of New Hampshire all objected to the
examiner's appointment under § 1104(b)(1). Id. at 179-81. The equity committee and the U.S.
Trustee supported the examiner's appointment. Id. The court appointed an examiner because of the
complexity of the utility case. Id. at 182. In addition, the court reasoned that even if cause did not
exist, an examiner was mandatory under § 1104(b)(2). Id.
150. Id. at 179.
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nesses. 151 The court reasoned that section 1106's broad language allowed
a court to expand the role of the examiner in complex cases.1 52  The
court concluded that appointing an examiner with extensive powers
would expedite the reorganization process and assist in resolving many
complex regulatory matters.1 53
In addition to Carnegie and Public Service, in In re Great Barrington
Fair & Amusement, Inc.,154 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Massachusetts also expanded an examiner's powers.1 55 During a Chap-
ter 11 reorganization of an amusement company, the court authorized an
examiner to formulate a confirmation plan for the reorganization. 1 6 De-
spite a creditor's vehement objections, the court confirmed the exam-
iner's plan.1 57 Without citing where the Code or case law grants an
151. Id. The court repeatedly commented on the complexity of the technical matters underlying
the reorganization. Id. at 182-83. At a minimum, the court wanted the examiner to serve, if nothing
else, as an "interpreter" of the technical terms in the "utility regulatory world." Id. at 182-83. The
creditors claimed that the appointment of examiner was not in the interests of the estate. Id. at 179-
81. However, the court quickly rebutted this charge. Id. at 182-83.
The court believed that it possessed the power to appoint an examiner sua sponte. Id. at 182. See
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988):
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to
carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for the raising of
an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court from, sua sponte,
taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or
implement court orders or rules, or to prevent an abuse of process.
Id. See also In re UNR Indus., Inc. 72 B.R. 789 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1987) (explaining that a court
may, on its own motion, appoint an examiner to monitor the status of the negotiations among the
parties); In re Landscaping Servs., 39 B.R. 588 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1984) (holding that if an examiner
is necessary, the court, by itself, may initiate the request).
152. Public Ser., 99 B.R. at 182-83. In order to justify granting the examiner's expanded pow-
ers, the court referred to a number of other large reorganization cases where courts appointed exam-
iners with expanded powers. Id. See In re Boileau, 736 F.2d 503 (9th Cir. 1984) (explaining that
parties stipulated to the examiner's appointment to avoid the appointment of a trustee); In re John
Peterson Motors, Inc., 47 B.R. 551 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (appointing an examiner in lieu of a
trustee, and vesting the examiner with all of the powers of a trustee to enable the debtor to continue
to operate the debtor's business); In re Carnegie Int'l Corp., 51 B.R. 252 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1984)
(granting the examiner expanded powers to initiate lawsuits on behalf of the debtor).
153. Public Serv., 99 B.R. at 182-83. In reality, the examiner may not expedite the reorganiza-
tion. Snider, supra note 12, at 51. However, appointing an expert in regulatory matters to serve as
an examiner may eliminate the potential for needless and expensive litigation of the complicated
technical issues involved. Public Ser., 99 B.R. at 182-83.
154. 53 B.R. 241 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985).
155. Great Barrington, 53 B.R. at 244.
156. Id. at 242. The examiner's reorganization plan created six classes of creditors. Id. The
claims filed against the debtor totaled approximately $600,000. Id. at 243.
157. Id. at 244. A large secured creditor, impaired under the examiner's plan, objected. Id.
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examiner the authority to propose a plan of reorganization, 158 the court
stated that the debtor, through the examiner, can take any corporate ac-
tion necessary to effectuate the consummation of the plan. The court
ruled that an examiner possessed the authority to file a plan for the es-
tate, because the examiner is a "party in interest" under section 1121 of
the Code.159
Recently, in In re A.H. Robins Co. "6 and In re Eastern Airlines,
Inc.,161 the bankruptcy courts for the Eastern District of Virginia and
Southern District of New York each appointed examiners with extensive
powers.1 62 In A.H. Robins, the court authorized the examiner to investi-
gate and evaluate the debtor, monitor the debtor's business, review finan-
cial data, interview creditors and employees and initiate any lawsuits on
behalf of the estate. 163 The court also granted the examiner the authority
to "take all other necessary and appropriate actions in furtherance of
assisting to bring this cause to a just, prompt and economic disposi-
tion." 16 Similarly, in Eastern Airlines, the court authorized broad pow-
ers for the examiner.65 Specifically, the bankruptcy court ordered the
examiner to determine the issues that needed resolution, to propose a
plan of reorganization, and to evaluate each major creditor's position. 166
B. Limited Role
In contrast to courts that have expanded the examiner's powers, at
least one court has recognized the distinct roles of the trustee and the
examiner. In In re International Distribution Centers, Inc. ,167 the credi-
The court approved the plan because it met the requirements of § 1129(b)(2)(A). Id. at 244. See 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1988).
158. Great Barrington, 53 B.R. at 244.
159. Id. at 244 n.3. But see 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988). Section 1121(c) provides: "Any party in
interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' com-
mittee, a creditor, an equity security holder, or any indenture trustee may file a plan." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1121(c) (1988). The section does not provide that a "party in interest" includes an examiner. Id.
160. No. 85-01307-R (Bankr. E.D. Va., Aug. 7, 1988), reprinted in Miller & Marcus, supra note
113, at 59.
161. No. 89-B-10449 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1989), cited in Snider, supra note 12, at 50-51.
162. Miller & Marcus, supra note 113, at 59-62; Snider, supra note 12, at 50-51.
163. A.H. Robbins, No. 85-01307-R (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 1988), reprinted in Miller & Mar-
cus, supra note 113, at 59-62.
164. Id. at 61.
165. Eastern Airlines, No. 89-B-10449 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. Mar. 30, 1989), reprinted in Miller &
Marcus, supra note 113, at 50-51.
166. Id. at 50.
167. 74 B.R. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
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tors sought to expand the examiner's powers to include duties identical
to those of a trustee.'68 The District Court for the Southern District of
New York refused to expand the examiner's powers. 169 First, the court
noted that Congress intended to afford the court flexibility to determine
the examiner's role in the reorganization case.170  However, the court
held that Congress did not intend for the examiner to become a "pseudo-
trustee."'' The court noted that the legislative history illustrated that
Congress intended separate and distinct roles for the trustee and the ex-
aminer.172 Reasoning that the trustee is accountable for the administra-
tion of the estate, the court found that investigative duties compose the
majority of the examiner's powers. 173 The court held that if a court exer-
cises its discretion to expand the examiner's role in the reorganization,
then the examiner's additional duties must remain confined within the
"investigative rubric" of section 1106(b). 74
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS FOR EXAMINERS IN FAILED LBO
CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATIONS
If a bankruptcy court appoints an examiner in a Chapter 11 case in-
volving a failed LBO corporation, the examiner may facilitate the com-
168. International Distrib., 74 B.R. at 221. The debtor was a large trucking company serving the
garment industry. Id. The creditors' committee initially moved for the appointment of a trustee
after the debtor failed to pay state and federal payroll taxes and incurred continuing financial losses.
Id. Instead of granting the creditors' motion for a trustee, the bankruptcy court appointed an exam-
iner pursuant to § 1104(b)(1). In re International Distrib. Ctrs., Inc., No. 85-B-il140 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1986). Later, the creditors moved to extend the examiner's powers under § 1106.
Id. Granting the motion the bankruptcy court ordered "that the examiner in this matter will have
the duties of a trustee as outlined in [§] 1106(a)."
169. International Distrib., 74 B.R. at 224.
170. Id.
171. Id. The court held that in the first hearing, the bankruptcy court abused its discretion
when it expanded the examiner's powers to equal those of a trustee. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. The court noted that § 1106 outlines the powers of trustees and examiners. Id. See 11
U.S.C. § 1106 (1988). Section 321(b) of the Code precludes one who has served as a trustee from
acting as an examiner in the same case. See 11 U.S.C. § 321(b) (1988). The court reasoned that a
court must interpret § 1106 in conjunction with § 321. International Distrib., 74 B.R. at 224. The
court determined that Congress enacted § 321 to eliminate any appearance of impropriety or conflict
of interest. Id. at 223. The court recognized that Congress wanted to forbid the examiner from
issuing a critical report in hopes of being appointed trustee. Id. In addition, the court also noted
that when Congress enacted § 321, the drafters specifically eliminated the dual examiner-trustee role
"peremptorily," not only where a conflict of interest actually existed. Id.
174. Id. The court held that the Code authorized the bankruptcy court to confer additional
duties upon the examiner as circumstances warrant. Id. However, the court cautioned that a court
may not allow an examiner to step into the shoes of a trustee. Id.
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pany's speedy reorganization. He may also encourage diverse parties to
resolve intricate relationships and disputes. Because of the expense and
the difficulties associated with appointing a trustee, 175 courts increasingly
favor the intermediate approach of an examiner. 176 Yet, for an examiner
to fulfill his duties and achieve maximum effectiveness, Congress should
revise the Bankruptcy Code to clarify the process of appointment and the
examiner's role in Chapter 11 reorganization cases.17 7
A. Reforms in the Appointment of Examiners
1. Section 1104(b)(1)
Congress must clarify section 1104(b), which governs the examiner's
appointment in a Chapter 11 business reorganization bankruptcy case.
First, when a party moves for the appointment of an examiner under
section 1104(b)(1), 171 the statute should define criteria for the courts to
consider. At a minimum, the court should refrain from appointing an
examiner unless sufficient evidence exists that the debtor committed
some impropriety. 179 However, courts must not assume that the criteria
for the trustee's appointment match the factors considered for the exam-
iner's appointment. 80 If the parties in interest believe that the court will
not appoint an examiner until the standards to appoint a trustee are met,
then Congress effectively created a disincentive to move for an
175. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND
CREDITORS 476 (2d ed. 1991). The fight over the truste's appointment often becomes a "life-or-
death struggle" when determining whether the business survives the reorganization. Id. at 474. The
trustee is a drastic measure. Id. He displaces the current management. See 11 U.S.C. § 1108
(1988). In addition, he must begin to operate the business immediately with little or no knowledge
of the debtor's entity. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra, at 474. Finally, the trustee imposes an addi-
tional expense on the financially strapped bankruptcy estate. Id. at 474-76.
176. WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 175, at 476. When a court appoints an examiner, it
avoids displacing the debtor's current and knowledgeable management. Id. Also, the examiner
provides comfort to the parties in interest as he conducts a disinterested examination and monitors
the debtor's past and present status, relationships, and activities. Id. at 474-76.
177. Committees in Congress have expressed concern that the current statutory provisions in the
Bankruptcy Code are not designed to protect interested parties in massive Chapter 11 LBO bank-
ruptcies. See P.M Briefing; Bush Prodded on Buyout Curbs, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 30, 1990, at P3.
Industry leaders have recently expressed their concerns before congressional committees. Financial
Advisor Says Bankruptcy Laws Fail to Protect LBO-Related Bondholders, 22 Sec. & Reg. L. Rep.
(BNA) No. 5, at 166 (Feb. 2, 1990). However, to date, Congress has declined to formally address
the concerns in the industry and public.
178. See supranote 22 for text of § 1104(b)(1).
179. Snider, supra note 12, at 37-38.
180. See supra part II.A.1.
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examiner.""
Courts which appoint an examiner in situations that do not warrant
appointment of a trustee focus on Congress' intent that an examiner
should provide a flexible, cost-effective alternative to a trustee. 1 2 Fur-
thermore, these courts recognize that when a case warrants an examiner,
the less stringent evidentiary standard creates an incentive for a party to
move earlier in the case for the appointment of an examiner. 3 If the
courts force the parties to continue to wait until the case requires a
trustee, then the courts frustrate the congressional intent favoring the
examiner. 184
Congress should adopt less stringent standards for an examiner's ap-
pointment than those governing a trustee. A less restrictive appointment
standard encourages parties to move for the examiner's appointment ear-
lier in the case, rather than seeking the appointment of independent audi-
tors, accountants, and other fiduciaries in a piecemeal fashion. If each
party in interest moves to appoint his own investigators, the court may
needlessly delay the reorganization. In addition, if the court grants each
party's motion, the court excessively burdens the bankruptcy estate and
wastes the debtor's limited assets. The appointment of one examiner to
conduct all the investigations benefits every party to the proceeding by
saving judicial resources and avoiding duplication of services.18 5
In addition, several courts have weighed the costs and benefits associ-
ated with an examiner before ordering his appointment. 186 Congress did
not include language in the statute regarding the costs and benefits re-
sulting from the examiner's appointment.' 7 This failure confuses courts
181. Snider, supra note 12, at 38.
182. See House Report, supra note 10, at 6193 ("The court may also adopt the less restrictive
alternative of ordering the appointment of an examiner...."). See supra part II.A.2.
183. Snider, supra note 12, at 38. If Congress and the courts require a higher standard, they
create a disincentive to move for an examiner. Id. Thus, a party may not move for an examiner
early in the bankruptcy process. Id. If this disincentive is created, the court and the parties will fail
to derive any benefit from the examiner's findings. Id.
184. See id. Because the examiner is less costly for the estate, the court should favor appointing
an examiner instead of a trustee.
185. See Snider, supra note 12, at 37-39.
186. See In re Gilman Servs., Inc., 46 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985); In re Table Talk, Inc.,
22 B.R. 706 (D. Mass. 1982); In re American Bulk Transp. Co., 8 B.R. 337 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
See also supra part II.A.3.
187. As originally introduced, § 1104(b)(2) of H.R. 8200 directed the bankruptcy court to con-
sider the costs involved with the examiner's appointment. See supra note 39 for the text of H.R.
8200. However, when Congress finally adopted § 1104(b) in 1978, the drafters eliminated the provi-
sions concerning costs. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(b) (1988).
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that rely on legislative history to formulate the cost-benefit analysis.1
8 1
Yet, because section 1104(b)(1) is "discretionary," perhaps a cost-benefit
analysis is warranted and within the court's discretionary domain.1
8 9
2. Section 1104(b)(2)
Congress should delete section 1104(b)(2)'s t9 0 so-called mandatory ap-
pointment provision.191 Besides containing ambiguous language, which
some courts have acknowledged with hostility, 9 2 the provision is incon-
sistent with the underlying policies of the Code.' 93 The Bankruptcy
Code encourages efficient management of the estate's resources.' 94 How-
ever, the mandatory provision frustrates the Code's purpose by forcing
the court to appoint an examiner, even if it previously appointed other
fiduciaries to investigate the LBO.195
3. Proposed Changes and Recommendations
As the number of LBOs in the bankruptcy courts begins to rise to
unprecedented levels in the 1990s, 196 courts may refuse to wait for Con-
gress to clarify the ambiguities of section 1104(b). The bankruptcy
188. Snider, supra note 12, at 38. Since § 1104 excluded the "costs" test of H.R. 8200, perhaps
the court should not consider the costs involved in determining whether the examiner's appointment
is in the creditors' interests. Id.
189. Id. In reality, a court may find it difficult not to consider the costs involved in any judicial
determination. Id.
190. See supra note 22 for text of § 1104(b)(2).
191. See Snider, supra note 12, at 41. Section 1104(b)(2) is the most "troublesome and contro-
versial" provision of the Code dealing with the examiner. Id.
192. See, eg., In re GHR Cos., Inc., 43 B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984), aff'd, 792 F.2d 476
(5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a court should consider facts and circumstances surrounding the case
as well as the amount of the debtor's leverage). See also supra part II.B.2.
193. "The overall objectives [of the Bankruptcy Code] are to make bankruptcy procedures more
efficient, to balance more equitably the interests of different creditors,.. . and to give the debtor a less
encumbered 'fresh start' after bankruptcy." S. REP. No. 1106, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS. (1978), re-
printed in 17 RESNICK & WYPYSKI, supra note 16, at Doc. 54.
194. "Judicial caution dictates that an intermediate procedure be first explored." In re Hamiel
& Sons, Inc., 20 B.R. 830, 833 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982).
195. The Code allows the creditors' committee to move for the appointment of fiduciaries to
investigate or audit the debtor., 11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1988). Section 1103(a) provides: "a committee
... with the court's approval .... may select and authorize the employment ... of one or more
attorneys, accountants, or other agents, to represent or perform services for such committee." Id.
196. Gregory Crouch, Q&A: William N. Lobel; The Boom in Bankruptcies, Law that Allows
Debtors to Buy Time Subject to Abuse, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1990, at D6. "We are all expecting the
bankruptcy business in the area of large Chapter 1 Is to get very busy because the heyday of junk
bond financing of leveraged buyouts lasted five years, and those junk bonds are just now starting to
come due." Id. (quoting Mr. Lobel).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss3/5
1992] BANKRUPTCY EXAMINERS IN LEVERAGED BUYOUTS
courts should liberally appoint examiners under section 1104(b)(1) when-
ever the moving party demonstrates that the debtor committed some act
to satisfy the "cause" requirement. 9 ' When a party moves for the ap-
pointment of an examiner under section 1 104(b)(2) pursuant to a mone-
tary threshold, the court should not limit its inquiry to the debtor's debt
level.19  As the courts in GHR 'I and Shelter Resources200 reasoned, the
bankruptcy courts should consider other facts and circumstances, includ-
ing the role of the examiner and of other fiduciaries already conducting
investigations.20 '
In addition, whenever a party moves for the appointment of a trustee
or an examiner, the court should conduct a cost-benefit analysis.20 2 In
failed LBOs and other large reorganizations, the existence of numerous
creditors and other parties in interest increases the possibility that the
examiner will duplicate tasks previously delegated to another party.20 3
Some courts argue that the possibility of duplication is minimal because
the bankruptcy court retains plenary control over the examiner's pow-
ers.2 "4 However, when large creditors exist or the court previously ap-
proved a motion to appoint a private accounting firm, auditor, or other
fiduciary entity to investigate the LBO, an examiner's mandatory ap-
pointment may not assist the reorganization.20 5 Instead, the examiner
may needlessly drain the estate and the debtor's limited funds.20 6 To
conserve the estate's resources, the court should at least refuse to grant
the examiner any duties delegated to other investigators or experts.
B. Reforms in the Duties and Role of an Examiner
Similar to the controversy surrounding the examiner's appointment,
Congress must clarify the role and scope of his duties. Most courts favor
197. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(bXl) (1988). See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
198. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
199. In re GHR Cos., 43 B.R. 165 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984), aff'd, 792 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1986).
200. In re Shelter Resources Corp., 35 B.R. 304 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).
201. See supra part II.B.2. See also Snider, supra note 12, at 44.
202. A cost-benefit analysis forces the courts to further the policies of the Code. See In re
Hamiel & Sons, Inc., 20 B.R. 830, 832 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982). The court envisioned the bank-
ruptcy process to reorganize companies in a cost-effective manner. See id. at 833.
203. See Shelter Resources, 35 B.R. at 305. See supra 120-28 and accompanying text.
204. See Revco, 898 F.2d at 501. In Revco, the court reasoned that the potential for abuse is
minimal because the bankruptcy court directs the examiner's investigation, including its nature, ex-
tent and duration. Id. See supra note 103.
205. See Snider, supra note 12, at 45.
206. Id.
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expanding the examiner's powers.2 °7 This judicial sentiment reflects a
trend toward decreasing the debtor's role as the operator of the business,
without forcing the estate to expend resources in appointing a trustee to
displace the debtor.20 8 Although this judicial inclination may assist the
bankruptcy courts in resolving complex matters, introducing an in-
dependent fiduciary, such as an examiner, greatly affects and impacts all
of the interested parties.209 As the examiner's role and powers in the
reorganization process increase through judicial intervention, creditors
may either lose influence over the case or become subjected to a plan
which the examiner proposed.21 0
Despite the competing concerns, the examiner is a cost-efficient inter-
mediate method of policing the debtor-in-possession.21' If a court ap-
points a trustee, the trustee replaces the debtor and assumes complete
control of the debtor's enterprise.21 2 On the other hand, an examiner
keeps his finger on the pulse of the business to protect the creditors' in-
terests, while also investigating the debtor's alleged improprieties or
fraud.213 If the court appoints an examiner, the examiner may calm the
creditors' fears and curb further depletion of the assets.214
However, as the judiciary attempts to expand the examiner's powers,
207. See supra part III.A.
208. Miller & Marcus, supra note 113, at 24. As the trend continues, courts may erode the
presumption that the debtor should continue to operate and manage his business. Id. at 24. The
courts may begin to favor appointing an independent fiduciary to control the reorganization as under
the former Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 24-25. If the court appoints an independent entity, the court
should appoint an examiner, rather than a trustee, because he is less intrusive. See In re Bible
Speaks, 74 B.R. 511, 512 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (appointing a trustee is the exception rather than
the rule); In re Anchorage Boat Sales, 4 B.R. 635 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that a trustee is
an extraordinary remedy).
209. Batson & Rivera, supra note 130, at 57. The examiner may "encroach" upon the creditors
and greatly influence the court. Id.
210. Id.
211. See In re Mako, Inc., 102 B.R. 809, 814 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1988).
212. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1106, 1108 (1988). A trustee may be undesirable because he is unfamiliar
with debtor's business. See In re Mako, Inc., 102 B.R. 809, 813-14 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1988) (hold-
ing that a trustees appointment was not in the creditors' best interests because the debtor possessed
greater ability to manage its complex business); In re Macon Prestressed Concrete Co., 61 B.R. 432,
439 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1986) (presuming that, absent a showing of fraud, the debtor should remain in
possession because the trustee imposes a substantial financial burden on the estate and may preclude
an effective reorganization); In re Parker Grande Dev., Inc., 64 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
1986) (describing appointment of a trustee as an extraordinary remedy which a court should not
grant lightly because he may impose substantial burdens on the reorganization).
213. Mako, 102 B.R. at 814. When a trustee is not warranted, an examiner is the proper remedy
to keep control over the estate during the reorganization proceedings. Id.
214. Id.
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the courts erode the distinctions between sections 1104 and 1106.215
Providing the examiner with too many powers allows him to step into the
trustee's shoes, without displacing the debtor. Perhaps Congress did not
envision such a crucial role for the examiner in effectuating a successful
corporate reorganization. If so, Congress should amend the Code to
evince its intentions in response to the judicial expansion of the exam-
iner's duties. Absent congressional directive, the bankruptcy courts
should continue to appoint an examiner with sufficient powers, support
the current management, and attempt to maximize the benefits an exam-
iner provides for the court and the estate.
Although an examiner with expansive investigatory power constitutes
an essential element in a failed LBO's successful reorganization, 16 Con-
gress should clarify the Code to emphasize the distinct functions of the
trustee and the examiner. Courts should liberally grant the examiner
broad investigatory powers, and allow the examiner to ascertain the posi-
tions of the parties involved. A court must permit an examiner to guide
the court on complex technical matters, and assist in expediting confir-
mation of the plan.217 However, recognizing the distinct roles of trustee
and examiners, the courts should not allow the examiner to become a
"pseudo-trustee. '2 18
As more and more LBOs file for bankruptcy in the future, the courts
desperately need congressional guidance in interpreting the statutory
provisions regarding the examiner. However, in the absence of any con-
gressional command, the courts will likely continue the trend of ordering
expansive powers for the examiner. 219 The Bankruptcy Code encourages
relief for the debtor and emergence out of bankruptcy as a healthier,
215. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
216. See, e.g., Revco Bankruptcy Examiner Finds Basis for Legal Claims Against Management,
Advisors and Lenders, supra note 14. In the Revco Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the examiner filed a final
report of over 300 pages. Id. The examiner reviewed more than 200,000 pages of documents and
interviewed over 50 people. Id. His report to the bankruptcy court suggested potential causes of
action available to Revco which would enable the bankruptcy estate to meet its creditors' claims. Id.
The examiner in the Interco bankruptcy filed a 556-page report. Kim Foltz, Business People:
Difficult Task Described by Examiner ofInterco, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1991, § 1 at 35. The exam-
iner researched over 370,000 pages of documents and interviewed many executives. Id. In October
1991, she filed her final two volume, three-inch thick report with the Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Missouri. Id.
217. See supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 167-74 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 175-77 and accompanying text.
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more efficient corporate entity.2 2 ° Provided that the courts do not under-
mine the Code's policies, the bankruptcy courts should grant the exam-
iner abundant investigatory and administerial powers.221
V. CONCLUSION
As the explosion of LBOs on Wall Street in the 1980s impacts the
bankruptcy courts in the 1990s, the courts will most likely continue to
favor appointing examiners."' Today, the bankruptcy courts are only
beginning to handle the vestiges of failed LBOs.223 Tomorrow, recession-
ary times will compound the sizeable debt of LBOs, and force a greater
number to seek bankruptcy protection.224 Thus, more bankruptcy courts
will grapple with the ambiguous statutory language, scant legislative his-
tory, and conflicting judicial interpretations regarding the examiner's ap-
pointment and duties.
Although the courts and failing businesses may wish for congressional
clarification,225 the bankruptcy courts should actively formulate a more
comprehensive and efficient approach to the use of an examiner. The
courts should recognize that an examiner may serve a vital function as a
cost-efficient and intermediate approach to policing the debtor and inves-
tigating the LBO transaction. In addition, the courts must continue the
trend toward ordering expansive powers for the examiner. Yet, the court
should cautiously avoid allowing the examiner to duplicate services per-
formed by other investigative fiduciaries previously appointed during the
reorganization. While appointing a trustee constitutes an extraordinary
remedy, the appointment of an examiner should become the ordinary
remedy in a failed LBO Chapter 11 reorganization.
Paula D. Hunt
220. See Legislative Statements, reprinted in BANKRUPTCY CODE, RULES AND OFFICIAL
FORMS: 1986 LAW SCHOOL & C.L.E. EDrION Ch. 11, at 281 (West 1986). "One cannot overem-
phasize the advantages of speed and simplicity to both creditors and debtors." Id. The success of a
corporation emerging from bankruptcy depends upon the ability to attract and retain skilled man-
agement, the ability to obtain credit, and the ability to project a public image of vitality. Id. at 280.
221. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
224. "A[n] LBO is a creature of time. In most cases its success or failure can't be determined for
three, four, five, or even seven years." BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE
GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO, at x (1990).
225. See supra note 177.
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